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ARTICLES
A HIGHER DUTY:
A NEW LOOK AT THE
ETHICS OF THE CORPORATE LAWYER

HE

coRPORATE

LAWYER

woRKS

IN

a complex world of finance and con-

T voluted business transactions involving intricate, ambiguous, and constantly evolving law. It is a world in which few significant transactions
can be concluded without his active participation; he is an indispensible
link in the chain. It is a world of "other people's money." 1
The effects of corporate action by public and large private corporations are often so substantial that they reach beyond the confines of the
business world and into the general community. Thus the lawyer performing a vital role in the corporate world can no longer disclaim responsibility for the results of his actions on the pretext that he is merely executing the desires of his client. And one would hope that while he
executes his legal function in the best interests of his client, he does so
without offending the mores of the public.
Although it has not always been clear to the legal profession that the
conduct of its most powerful clients affects ethical responsibilities, the resulting problems have become more evident in recent years to the courts,
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), and members of the
bar. Moreover, there is what might be termed the evolving "Watergate
principle" - that there are matters of significant public concern in which
a lawyer may have an even greater duty to the citizenry than to his
client. Recent developments have been diffuse, and include a changing
legal conceptualization of corporations as well as numerous considerations involved in corporate legal representation. Viewed together and
placed into focus, these developments shed considerable light on the
sometimes conflicting duties of the corporate lawyer to clients and to the
public. While some of these ethical questions are of interest to all
attorneys, the current ethical dilemmas of the lawyer representing public corporations and the corporate specialist dealing in matters relating
to the federal securities acts 2 can be especially acute.
The legal establishment has resisted any changes in the duty of a law• A.B., New York University; J.D., Harvard; LL.M., New York University; Member, New
York and Virginia Bars; Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School
of Law.
1 See L. BRANDEIS, OrnER PEoPLE's MoNEY (1933).
2
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. H 77a-77aa (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. ~§ 78a-78kk (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. H 80a-1 to -52 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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yer as articulated in the Code of Professional Responsibility, 3 producing
potential conflicts with evolving developments in the courts and the SEC,
as well as rising public expectations. However, as former Commissioner
Sommers suggested, "the security bar's conception of its role too sharply
contrasts with the reality of its role in the securities process . . . and in
such situations the reality eventually prevails. . . . I would suggest that
the bar will make a serious error if it seeks to defend itself against the
emerging trends by reliance upon old shibboleths and axioms. Society
will not stand for it. " 4 This article will analyze recent developments and
endeavor to offer some solutions to the ethical conflict by proposed
changes in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
I.

THE CORPORATE LAWYER

The lawyer's traditional role as an adversary representing a clearly
identifiable client with undivided loyalty is reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, 5 with the underlying presumption that by such
service the lawyer best serves society. 6 This description and the underlying presumption are not consistent with the modern practice of a corporate lawyer, economic reality, or recent legal developments.
The practice of the lawyer representing public corporations is unique.
He represents corporations whose shares are held by members of the public, either directly as shareholders or indirectly as participants in mutual
funds, retirement plans, or the like7 and whose activities affect both large
numbers of employees and the national economy. 8 In his representation
a corporate lawyer rarely functions in an adversary position, particularly
where legal opinions or disclosure problems involving the securities acts
are concerned. Although attorneys for an issuer9 and underwriter10 in a
public offering may have honest differences concerning the contents of a
registration statement, they have a common interest in consummating the
See text accompanying note 121 and Part IV B of the text infra.
Speech of A. A. Sommer, Jr., The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, (1973-1974) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1179,631, at 83,689, 83,691.
5 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons of Judicial Ethics [hereinafter
ABA Code] EC 5-18 states in part that "a lawyer employed or retained by a corporation
or similar entity owes his allegiance to the entity and not to the stockholder, director,
officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with the entity."
6 ABA Code Preamble.
7 See New York Stock Exchange, Shareownership - 1970, Census of Shareowners (undated pamphlet).
6 Two examples will illustrate the significance of public corporations.
In 1976
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. had consolidated sales and revenu~s of $33 billion,
927,000 employees, and 3,500,000 shareholders. Moooy's Pusuc UTIUTY MANUAL 117,
121 (1977). General Motors Corp. had consolidated sales and revenues of $47 billion,
748,000 employees, and 1,300,000 shareholders. 1 Moooy's lNoUSTRIAL MANUAL 725, 727
(1976).
9 An issuer is defined in section 2(4) of the 1933 Act to include every person (including a corporation) "who issues or proposes to issue any security." 15 U.S.C. § 77b-4
(1970 & Supp. V 1975).
10 An underwriter is defined in section 2(11) of the 1933 Act to include "any person
who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection, with the distribution of a security." 15 U.S.C. § 77b-ll (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
3

4
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offering and avoiding a common liability under section II of the 1933
Act. 11 Similarly, in a merger the proxy statement12 is prepared jointly
by counsel and is almost identical for both corporate parties, since both
corporations must meet essentially the same legal requirements under
the securities acts. 13 Again there is a mutual interest in effectuating the
transaction and avoiding liabilities since the merged corporation will be
liable for all obligations of both corporations. In these common examples,
the interests of the clients are parallel; they succeed or fail together, and
their attorneys are in effect attorneys for the situation. When an attorney
prepares or reviews a proxy statement, a press release, an annual report
to shareholders, 14 or an annual report to the SEC on form 10K, 15 there is
no second party at all. Moreover, these legal problems are largely ones
of disclosure to the public, requiring an act which the lawyer could undertake himself, in lieu of and independently of his client, if he possessed the
information and it were proper to do so either by advising the SEC or
otherwise. 16
The corporate lawyer is often indispensible to the consummation of a
transaction, particularly when a legal opinion is a customary condition of
closing17 as in a merger, 18 public offering19 or sale of restricted se11

Section ll(a) provides in part:
In case any part of the registration statement when such becomes effective,
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein
not misleading, any person acquiring such a security . . . may, either at law or in
equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction sue(1) every person who signed the registration statement;
(2) every person who was a director of . . . the issuer at the time of the
filing of the part of the. registration statement with respect to which his liability
is asserted;

(4) every accountant ... or an appraiser whose profession gives authority
to a statement made by him who has with his consent been named as having
prepared or certified any part of the registration statement or as having prepared or
certified any report . . . which is used in connection with the registration statement,
with respect to the statement in such registration statement, report . . . , which
purports to have been prepared or certified by him;
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
12 The requirements of a proxy statement are codified in Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-101 (1977), passed pursuant to section 14(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) with respect to securities registered under section 12 of
the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
13 Schedule 14 A, Item 14, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1977).
14 Under rules passed pursuant to the 1934, .ct, an annual report to shareholders must be sent
to all shareholders in connection with an annual meeting of shareholders at which directors are to
be elected. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3(b), C-2(a} (1977).
1s 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1977).
16 See
In re Emanual Fields. Securities Act Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973),
[1973] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 11 79,407; Speech of A. A. Sommer, Jr., The Commission
and the Bar: Forty Good Years, quoted in Matthews, Liabilities of Lawyers Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 30 Bus. LAw. 105, 119-21 (1975).
17 See United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 {2d Cir. 1964).
18 See note 106 infra.
19 See Schneider and Manko, Going Public Practice, Procedure and Consequences,
15 VIL. L. REV. 283, 295 {1970).
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curities. 20 Moreover, the importance of the lawyer's role in the preparation of SEC registration statements is emphasized in the following
reflections of A. A. Sommer:
[The registration statement] has always been a lawyer's document and with very, very rare exceptions the attorney has been
the field marshall who coordinated the activities of others engaged in the registration process, wrote (or at least rewrote) most
of the statement, made the judgments with regard to the inclusion or exclusion of information on the grounds of materiality,
compliance with registration form requirements, necessities of
avoiding omission of disclosure necessary to make those matters
stated not misleading. . . . With the exception of the financial
statements, virtually everything else in the registration statement
bears the imprint of counsel. 21
The central role of the corporate lawyer is further emphasized by the
philosophy of self-regulation as "the mainspring of the federal securities
laws." 22 The SEC exercises no supervisory functio~ in such important
areas as private offerings, sales of securities pursuant to Rule 144,23
annual reports to shareholders, and press releases. Even when it does
assume an active role, as in the processing of registration statements or
proxy material, the SEC does not make an independent examination of
the facts but basically relies upon the information contained in the documents furnished to it, 24 which are primarily the work of lawyers and
accountants. ·The resources of the SEC are too meager for it to be otherwise.25 This situation has made the "courts alert to provide such
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose,"26
so that the Supreme Court has allowed private remedies for violation of
the proxy rules 27 and Rule lOb-5, 28 despite the absence of an express statutory right to bring a private civil action. 29 This system of self-regulation will not function without the cooperation of the bar, and, therefore,
"the task of enforcing the securities law rests in overwhelming measure
on the bar's shoulders,"30 and places upon the securities bar a rigorous
standard of professional honor.
Finally, the SEC has consciously adopted a program to improve pro20

See SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
See Speech of A. A. Sommer, Jr., supra note 4, at 83,688.
22 Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 370 (2d Cir.
1973).
23 17 C.F.R. § 230-144 (1977).
24 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
25
See In re Emanual Fields, Securities Act Release No. 5404, (June 18, 1973), (1973]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 79,407, at 83,175.
26 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
27 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
26
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
29 Id.
See also J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964); Kardon v. Nat'(.
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E. D. Pa. 1946).
30 In re Emanual Fields, Securities Act Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973) [1973] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11-79,407, at 83,175.
21
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fessional performance in the belief that "[e]ven if certain businessmen
are not moved to full compliance by ethical considerations or the fear of
punishment, they will do far less damage if their lawyer and accountants
won't play"31 the game of business without regard for the law.

II. THE
A.

CoRPORATE ATTORNEY's

DUTY

Identification of the Client

The starting point for an analysis of the ethical duties of a corporate
lawyer must be the identification of his client. For most lawyers this is
obvious, but for the corporate lawyer the matter may not be so simple,
the difficulty being in the unique structure and nature of a corporation. A
corporation is an artificial entity created by law, operated by officers
and employees, and under the management of a board of directors for the
benefit of the shareholders. The shareholders elect the directors who
select the president32 who in turn customarily retains and discharges
counsel. Who then is the lawyer's client? Is it the corporate entity in
whose name the lawyer acts, the directors who manage the corporation,
the shareholders who own the corporation, or the president who has
hired and can fire the attorney? 33 Client identification appears to be
the key to much of the difficulty encountered by the SEC in dealing with
the professional conduct of securities lawyers. 34
Normally, numerous interests of the parties comprising the corporation
are intertwined, and the lawyer is said to represent the "corporate entity."35 This is an overly simplified fiction which does not stand
analysis. For example, when the lawyer of a solvent, profitable corporation assists in a dissolution, or a merger in which the corporation will
not be the survivor, he is not acting in the best interests of the corporate
entity, but presumably that of its shareholders.

B. Changing Legal Conceptualizations of the Corporation
As long as the entity theory persisted undiminished, the question
whether a corporate lawyer owed any duty to the shareholders of his corporate client could not be asked. The recognition of shareholders as a
separate legal component not always subsumed within the corporate
entity came first in civil litigation under section lOb of the Securities
Exchange Act of 193436 and Rule lOb-5. 37 For example, in Pappas v.

31 See Speech of R. Garrett, Jr., Professional Responsibility and the Securities Laws,
quoted in 30 Bus. LAw. 118, 119 (Special Issue, March, 1975).
32 See, e.g., DEL. ConE tit. 8, §§ 104, 141, 142, 211 (1974).
It is the practice of some
corporations for the board of directors to approve the retention of counsel who is nevertheless chosen by the chief executive officer.
33 See Freeman, Opinion Letters and Professionalism, 1973 DUKE L. J. 371, 374.
~ See Speech of R. Garrett, Jr., supra note 31.
35 See note 5 supra.
36 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
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Moss3 8 the board of directors of a listed company, all but one of whom
were officers, and who in the aggregate owned more than fifty percent
of the outstanding stock, issued a large block of the shares of the company's common stock to themselves at a fraudulently low price. Plaintiff, a minority shareholder, alleged in a derivative action on behalf of the
corporation39 that they were guilty of fraud and misrepresentation in the
sale, a direct violation of Rule lOb-5. 40 The defendants argued that the
corporation could only act through its agents, and that all of its agents,
the directors, were aware of the facts so that the corporation was not
deceived. 41 The Third Circuit found the required deception by viewing
the fraud "as though the 'independent' stockholders were standing in
place of the defrauded corporate entity at the time the original resolution
authorizing the stock sale was passed."42 Certainly, it was pointed out,

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
37
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) _To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
Promulgated under section 10 of the 1934 Act, see note 35 supra, Ruie 10b-5 has
become the basic provision of the 1934 Act to prevent fraud in the purchase and sale
of securities and has been broadly construed to effect its remedial purpose. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). The SEC is given a right to
bring actions under section 21 of the 1934 Act, 15 U .S.C.§ 78u (1970), and a private right of action
has been inferred from the rule. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6
(1971); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa.1946). The core of the rule is
that all investors should have equal access to the rewards of participation in securities
transactions, be· subject to equal market risk, and have equal access to material information
available to insiders. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851 (2d Cir. 1968).
38
393 F.2d 865 (3rd Cir. 1968); See also Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241
(5th Cir. 1971).
39
See FED. R. Crv. P. 23.1, which sets forth the conditions for bringing a derivative
action in the federal courts:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders . . . to enforce a
right of a corporation . . . , the corporation . . . having failed to enforce a right
which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall
allege (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder . . . at the time of the transaction
of which he complains. . . . The derivative action may not be maintained if it
appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests
of the shateholders . . . similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation.
40
Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 868 (3rd Cir. 1968).
41 l d. at 869.
42Jd.
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"the deception of the independent stockholders is no less real because
'formalistically' the corporate entity was the victim of the fraud." 43
A similar fracturing of the corporate entity was reached by the Second
Circuit in Sehoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 44 in which the complaint in the derivative action alleged that defendants, the directors of Banff Oil, Ltd.,
knowing of oil discoveries by Banff, conspired to sell to its controlling
corporate shareholder, Aquitaine Company of Canada, Ltd., the other
defendant, shares of stock of Banff at vastly inadequate prices. 45 The
Second Circuit, sitting en bane, overruled a panel decision and held
that the complaint stated a triable claim under Rule 10b-5, even though
all of the directors were aware of the facts. 48 In his dissenting panel
opinion, Judge Hays, who wrote the majority en bane opinion, dealt with
the corporate entity question and stated that "[e]ndowing a corporation
with a fictitious 'personality,' so that for example it has 'knowledge' is a
useful device for the analysis of many problems. But it can also constitute a trap for the unwary when they ascribe reality to the fictions. . . .
There is, of course, no justification for interposing the corporate fiction
between the directors and the minority stockholders who were the victims
of the directors' fraudulent actions." 47
With a similar disregard for the unitary corporate entity, the Supreme
Court in ].1. Case v. Borak48 combined the rights of a group of shareholder of J .I. Case Company brought an action alleging that a consummated
holders to create a derivative corporate cause of action. 49 A stockmerger with American Tractor Corporation was effected through the use
of a false and misleading proxy statement in violation of Section 14a of
the 1934 Act. 50 The Supreme Court held that section 27 of the 1934 Act
authorized a derivative and a direct private federal cause of action for
violation of section 14(a) of the 1934 Act by the complaining stockholder,
stating that "[t]he injury which a stockholder suffers from corporate
action pursuant to a deceptive proxy solicitation ordinarily flows from
the damage done the corporation, rather than the damage inflicted directly upon the stockholder. The damage suffered results not from the
deceit practiced on him alone but rather from the deceit practiced on
the stockholders as a group. ro hold that derivative actions are not
within the sweep of the section would be tantamount to a denial of private relief."51 The Court held that the statute granted such a derivative

43Jd.
44
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.) (rehearing en bane}, rev'g in part 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
See Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970). See also Santa Fe Industries, Inc.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 475 n. 15 (1977) (citing the foregoing cases and Pappas v. Moss,
393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968) with apparent approval}.
45
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1968).
46
Id. at 219.
47 405 F.2d 200, 215.
48 377 u.s. 426 (1964).
49
Id. at 432.
50 I d. at 4~.
51
Id. at 432.
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right despite the absence of a specific reference to a private right of action in section 14(a).s2

C.

Duty to Shareholders

The trend in the federal courts to disregard the corporate entity in
favor of treating the rights of shareholders independently when the circumstances require has application to the relationship of a corporate
attorney to his client, although the Code of Professional Responsibility
of the American Bar Association has and continues to postulate that the
corporate entity alone is always the lawyer's client. 53 The ABA position
was specifically rejected by the Fifth Circuit in Garner v. Wolfinbarger,54 in which access to communications between the attorney for
the corporation and its officers was sought in a derivative suit charging
the corporation and its officers with acts injurious to the interest of the
plaintiffs as stockholders. 55 The defendant objected to the disclosure on
the grounds of attorney-client privilege. 56
Taking note of the ABA brief presented as amicus the court could not
accept that "prospective decision of the client on whether to abide by
advice or disregard it, or the guarantee of a veil of secrecy, either
establishes or narrows the attorney's obligation in giving advice. And to
grant to corporate management plenary assurance of secrecy for opinions
received is to encourage it to disregard with impunity the advice
sought."57 Nor did the Fifth Circuit find "[c]onceptualistic phrases describing the corporation as an entity separate from its stockholders" a useful tool of analysis, for it served only "to obscure the fact that management
has duties which run to the benefit ultimately of the stockholders.''56
Therefore, if all the shareholders wished to inquire into a communication
between the corporation's representatives and the company's attorney
they would clearly have a right to do so. 59 When a minority shareholder
seeks access to the communication, then discretion must be exercised by
the court in granting such access to protect the interests of the other
shareholders. 60
The court was also persuaded that two traditional exceptions to the
attorney-client privilege were pertinent: communications in contempla-

Id. at 431.
See note :;; supra.
54 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
52

53

See also

Bailey v. Meister Brau, 55 F.R.D. 211 (N.D. Ill. 1972). Cf. Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68
F.R.D. 361 (D. Del. 1975), where the court held that the attorney for defendant-majority
·shareholders, who was also a member of the Board of Directors of the same corporation,
could not protect defendant by claiming privileged communications at the expense of· his
corporate clients, the plaintiH-minority shareholders.
55 Gamer v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d at 1095.
58 Id. at 1096.
57 Id. at 1102.
58 Id. at 1101.
59

eo

Id.
Id. at 1101 n. 17.
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tion of a crime or fraud, 61 and communications to a joint attorney. 62
The latter exception was found to apply on the theory that counsel was
acting on behalf of or at least for the benefit of the shareholders as well
as the corporate entity. 63
The logic of the Fifth Circuit has a broader implication for the corporate attorney-client relationship than the question of privilege, particularly with respect to the voluntary disclosure of pertinent matters to
the shareholders by counsel under appropriate circumstances. A public
corporation is not an end or an entity unto itself, but a means to an end
through the organization of capital for a large number of shareholders
who are the sole owners of the corporation. 64 If this position is correct
and the shareholders are therefore the ultimate client of counsel to a public corporation, then it is reasonable to propose that the SEC and the
courts adopt as a public policy the assumption that shareholders expect
their company to be run in a lawful manner. If the corporation acting
through its board of directors or management does not meet that expectation, it is a breach of the shareholders' trust. A corporate attorney
should have a duty to fulfill the expectation of integrity of his ultimate
client, the shareholders. When that expectation fails because of corporate misconduct as to a material matter, the attorney should have a duty
to disclose these facts to the shareholders. When there are a large number of shareholders, direct communication may not be possible, and in
any event such widely disseminated information would quickly become
public. In view of the impracticality of direct disclosure, the attorney
should be obliged instead to make appropriate disclosures to the SEC or
other authorities, at least as to matters that are breaches of law or would
be breaches of law if not disclosed, and if it is clear the corporation
through its directors or officers will not make the required disclosure.
Under this theory, the attorney-client privilege would not be applicable to
such disclosure situations. 65 Moreover, the attorney's duty to the corporation's shareholders and his duty to the public are likely to be
congruous. 66

D.

Duty to Public

For the past decade a doctrine has been developing cautiously in the
securities law that a corporate lawyer may have a duty not only to his
client, whomever that may be, but to the general public, or at least the
investing public, as well. 67

61

Id. at 1102.
Id.
63
Id. at 1103.
64
Id. at 1101. Shareholders elect directors, must approve any charter amendments,
mergers, dissolutions, etc., and alone are entitled to all of the net profits and net assets
of the corporation. See, e.g., ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act§§ 34, 54, 67, 77, 80.
65
See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
66
See part III D of the text infra.
67
For a discussion of the traditional viewpoint of the duty of a securities lawyer, see
62
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The first significant assertion of the attorney's duty to others beside
his corporate client occurred in Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp. 68
This was an action for damages under section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933 (1933 Act) 69 against the BarChris Corporation and its officers,
directors, accountants, and attorneys. The suit was brought by purchasers of BarChris debentures in a public offering, who alleged and
proved that the company's registration statement contained materially
false and misleading statements. 70 The court first noted the longstanding position of the bar, accepted by the SEC, that the lawyer preparing a registration statement is not liable under section ll(a)(4) of the
1933 Act71 for the material prepared by him, although the accountant was
~iable as an expert with respect to his audit. 72 The court then considered
the liability of Grant, an outside director, signer of the BarChris registration statement, and partner of the law firm responsible for its preparation. Grant had asserted a due diligence defense73 under section
ll(b)(3). 74 In disallowing the defense, the court found that more was
required of Grant in the way of reasonable investigation than could be
fairly expected of an outside director who had no connection with the
preparation of the registration statement.75 Such an outside director,
one who was not an officer of BarChris, would at a minimum have had to
read the prospectus with care, and to make some investigation of its
accuracy with the diligence a prudent man would employ in the management of his own property. 76 Grant, who as counsel for BarChris prepared
the registration statement, should not have relied solely upon the officers
of the corporation, but should have at least checked those matters easily
verifiable and tested oral information against the original written record
including minutes and material contracts. 77 Had he made such a reasonLowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers, 74 CoLUM. L. REv.
412, 413 (1974).
68 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
69
See note 11 supra. See also Lowenfels, supra note 66, at 428.
7 0 283 F. Supp. at 652.
71 See note 11 supra.
72 283 F. Supp. at 683.
73
I d. at 682, 683.
74
15 U.S.C. § 77 K(b)(3) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) sets forth the due dilligence which
expulpates directors, but not the issuer, from section 11(a) of the 1933 Act for false and
misleading statements contained in a registration statement:
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) no person, other than
the issuer, shall be liable as provided therein who shall sustain the burden of
proof(3) that (A) as regards any part of the registration statement not purporting
to be made on the authority of an expert, and not purporting to be a copy of or
extract from a report or . . . of an expert, . . . he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such
part of the registration statement became effective, that the statements therein
were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading;
75 283 F. Supp. at 690.
76 Id. at 688.
77
Id. at 690-92.
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able independent investigation of the non-expertised portion of the
prospectus, he would have uncovered many of the false and misleading
statements or omissions. 78 The fact that Grant honestly believed the
registration statement to be true and that no material facts had been
omitted was insufficient. 79 While this is technically a decision relating to
Grant's due diligence defense as a director, his duty as a director to members of the purchasing public was broadened because of his function in
preparing the registration statement as an attorney for the registrant. 80
As Judge McLean pointed out, this was not a malpractice suit. Grant's
obligation did not necessarily run only to the client corporation, but also
to those members of the public at large who as purchasers of the debentures had a cause of action against Grant as a director. 81
The court in BarChris treated Grant as an outside director with special
responsibilities. In Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. 82
which strongly relied on BarChris, however, the court considered a
due diligence defense asserted by a lawyer in an action under section 11 of
the 1933 ActB3 for false and misleading statements in a registration
statement used in connection with an acquisition. The court treated the
lawyer as an inside director because of his close involvement as counsel
with his client's affairs. 84 The standard of due diligence for an inside
director is so high that as a practical matter his liability approaches that
of a guarantor of the accuracy of the registration statement. 85 Counsel
in this case was involved in all aspects of the acquisition from the preliminary stages to the conclusion of the transaction, and was directly
responsible for the preparation of the registration statement.86 Thus
again, a lawyer's legal role altered his obligations not to his clients, but
to the plaintiff purchasers under section 11 of the 1933 Act. 87 Lawyers
have generally accepted the application of the BarChris standards of
diligence even when they are not directors.
In the same year that BarChris was decided, the Second Circuit in
SEC v. Frank 88 reviewed what appears to be the first instance in which
Id.
I d. at 690.
8o Id.
8t Id.
82 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) ..
83 15 U.S.C. § 77 K(b)(3)(A) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
84 332 F. Supp. at 576.
85
I d. at 579.
86 I d. at 576.
87 The court did not speak of the lawyer's liability qua lawyer. However, the difference
in the standard of care expected of an outsider director and an outside director who is
also counsel for the company is an indication of the care owed by the attorney to the
public who relied on the prospectus he prepared, and to the corporate issuer which may
have relied on the attorney to perform his functions in such a way as to avoid liability for
his client. See STAFF REPORT OF THE SEC ro 11fE SPEaAL SUBOOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGA78

79

TIONS OF THE CoMMITI'EE oN INTEflSTATE AND FoREIGN CoMMERCE, THE FINANCIAL CoLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL CoMPANY 113 (Subcomm. Reprint 1972), which discusses

one company's policy of nondisclosure of financial liabilities.
88 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
See also United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d tn7
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the SEC obtained an injunction against an attorney for alleged violations
of the fraud provisions of the securities law based upon his "participation in the preparation of an allegedly misleading offering circular or
prospectus"89 in connection with a public offering of securities. The
defendant contended that the alleged misrepresentations had been furnished to him by the officers of his client, and that he had been no more
than a scrivener placing the ideas in proper form. The court rejected
this argument. 90 A lawyer may not properly assist in the preparation of
an offering circular or prospectus which he knows to be false simply
because the misinformation was furnished to him by his client. 91 At the
other extreme, the court found it unreasonable to hold a lawyer responsible for reasonable technical errors in the explanation of a chemical process he was describing. 92 What the attorney should have known was a more
difficult question. 93 If the information is of a kind that even a non-expert
should recognize as false, then the lawyer must refrain from using it. 94 The
court did not establish guidelines as to how far such a lawyer should go when
preparing an offering circular or registration statement to run down possible
infirmities in his client's story of which he has been put on notice. 95
Obviously, the grounds for the injunction in Frank were nota breach of duty
by the lawyer to his client, whose wishes he carried out too well, but a breach
of duty to the offerees and purchasers of his client's securities. 96
In 1973 the Second Circuit again examined the duty of a securities
lawyer in SEC v. Spectrum Ltd. 91 As a result of a merger pursuant to
Rule 133 under the 1933 Act, 98 one of the shareholders of the acquired
company received a substantial block of unregistered stock of Spectrum.
The shareholder retained Schiffman, an attorney who was not familiar
(2d Cir. 1972), in which an attorney prepared false visa petitions on behalf of aliens who
had entered into sham marriages in order to gain entry into the United States. He was
convicted of aiding and abetting others to make false statements, because the petitions
were prepared with a reckless disregard of whether the statements in the petition were
true, and with a conscious effort to avoid learning the truth, despite a contention that
such a rule alters the lawyer-client relation.
89 388 F.2d at 488.
The Second Circuit reversed on procedural grounds and returned
the case to the district court for further findings of fact. Id. at 493.
90 I d. at 488-89.
91 /d. at 489 (citing United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964)).
92Jd.
93

Id.

94Jd.
95Jd.
98

ld. at 488.
489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
98 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1976).
Rule 133 provided that for purposes of section 5 of
the 1933 Act only, certain mergers would not be deemed to involve a sale or offer to sell
securities of the surviving corporation to the security holders of the disappearing corporation. The rule provided that controlling persons of the constituent corporations could not,
except for certain limited amounts, publicly sell their securities in the surviving corporation (whether previously owned or received on the merger) without registration under
the 1933 Act. The defendant counsel's opinion in Spectrum incorrectly opined that a
shat'eholder (who in fact was a controlling shat'eholder in a constitutent corporation)
could publicly sell his share without registration.
7
9
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with the merger, to write an opinion letter on the legality of the sale of
the proposed stock. After making some preliminary inquiries Schiffman
wrote an opinion letter addressed to his client, which was subsequently
furnished by the client to a broker to facilitate the illegal sale of his
unregistered securities - a violation of section 5 of the 1933 Act. 99 The
SEC alleged that Schiffman was therefore an aider and abettor of the
illicit sale and that it was not necessary to show actual knowledge plus an
intent to further the improper scheme. 100 On appeal the Second Circuit
held that the imposition of a mere negligence standard was appropriate,
at least in an injunction proceeding, because "[t]he legal profession
plays a unique and pivotal role in the implementation of the securities
law . . . and the smooth functioning of the securities markets will be
seriously disturbed if the public cannot rely on the expertise proffered
by an attorney when he renders an opinion on such matters."101 Here
again, the alleged violation of the lawyer's duty was not to the attorney's
client but to the public.
These ideas were even more broadly stated in SEC v. National Student
Marketing Corp. (NSMC), 102 where the SEC sought an injunction against
attorney Robert Katz for aiding and abetting the violation of the antifraud and reporting sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 103 Katz had
rendered an opinion letter which stated that title to, and risk of loss of, a
subsidiary of NSMC which was losing money had passed to the purchasers
on August 29, 1969, although the agreement for the sale of stock of the
subsidiary was not executed until that November. 104 The opinion was
written by Katz as attorney for the purchasers, but addressed to NSMC, the
15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1970). See 489 F.2d at 538-40.
489 F.2d at 540-41. Cf. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964)
(in which the defendant attorney's role was sometimes more than that of an attorney and
he was aware his legal opinions would be used to perpetrate a fraud).
101 489 F.2d at 541.
But cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (in
which the Supreme Court held that a professional is not civilly liable under Rule lOb-5
of the Securities Exchange Act for negligence, but left open the questions of civil liability
for reckless conduct, and injunctive relief for negligence under the rule). In SEC v.
World Radio Mission, Inc., 554 F.2d 535 (lst Cir. 1976), decided after Ernst & Ernst,
the court held that scienter is not required for injunctive relief for violations of Rule
lOb-5. However, of the cases cited in part III of the text, only SEC v. National Student
Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973) relies at all on Rule lOb-5.
102 402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1975).
103 Id. at 642-43. Katz allegedly violated section l7(a) of the 1933 Act, which reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(!) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). Katz was also accused of aiding and abetting a violation of Rule
lOb-5 (see note 37 supra for the text of the rule) and of the corporate reporting requirements of section l3(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
104 402 F. Supp. at 644-45.
99

100

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

350

[Vol. 26:325

selling corporation. Its purpose was, as Katz allegedly knew, to allow
NSMC's accountants to exclude the losses of the subsidiary from NSMC
financials for the three-month period between August, 1969, and the
date of the NSMC financial statements. In denying a motion by Katz
for summary judgment, the court said that even if Katz's legal opinion
was technically correct, as it appears it may have been, "[l]awyers are
not free to ignore the commercial substance of a transaction which could
obviously be misleading to stockholders and the investing public. . . .
Katz's focus on the narrow legal questions on which he opined is unrealistic in view of his participation in the total transaction which obviously
had the possibility for [sic] misleading outsiders." 105
Thus it appears from the above that the courts, sometimes prodded by
the SEC, have begun to recognize that the duty of a lawyer runs not only
to the corporate entity but to its shareholders 106 and at least in certain
circumstances to the public, that such duty includes a standard of due
care, and that this duty sometimes supercedes the privilege protecting
confidential communications between a client and his attorney.

E.

Conflicts between the Duties to the Client and the Public

The duty of care to exercise due diligence and proper ethical conduct
which runs from a corporate lawyer to the public may be an expansion of
his obligations inconsistent with the duty owed to his corporate client. 107
Conflict may arise, for example, when there are purportedly privileged
communications, 108 or where the public good and the good of the corporation as an entity do not coincide. The SEC maintained that the public
good must come first in another aspect of their proceedings against
NSMC. 109 The agency alleged violations of the anti-fraud, 110 proxy,lll

1 5
0
106

Id. at 647 (emphasis added).
See Parts III A-D of the text for a survey of the trend toward establishing a duty
of care owed by the corporate attorney to both the stockholders and the public at large.
107
An attorney normally advises his client how to conform to the law, including the
securities acts, advice completely consistent with his obligations to the public. See
AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, STATEMENT OF POUCY REGARDING RESPONSIBILITIES AND
LIABILITIES OF LAWYERS IN ADVISING WITH RESPECT TO THE CoMPUANCE BY CUENTS
WITH LAws ADMINISTERED BY THE SEC (adopted Aug. 12, 1975), reprinted in 31 Bus.
LAw. 543, 545 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ABA STATEMENT OF Poucr REGARDING
SEC CoMPUANCE]. The difficulty arises only if the attorney is in error through negligence
or otherwise, or the client refuses to follow his advice. The lawyer's concern about his
personal exposure for negligence has been ameliorated somewhat by Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See note 101 supra.
108
See Part IV of the text infra.
109
SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973), and SEC
v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1975), both derive from the
same Commission complaint but relate to different transactions of NSMC. A settlement
of the Commission's action was entered into between the Commission and White & Case,
one of the attorney defendants, which by its terms did not constitute an admission by
White & Case and pursuant to which they have agreed to undertake certain remedial internal procedures with respect to their practice of securities law in general, and representation of National Student Marketing Corporation in particular. As part of the stipulation, White & Case agreed in connection with any transaction involving the issuance of
securities to the puqlic: (1) not to deliver with respect thereto an opinion if it has knowl-
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and reporting 112 sections of the securities laws in a merger context.
The defendants were both public companies which were subject to the
proxy rules of the Exchange Act. 113 The merger agreement contained
the customary clause that, as a condition of the closing, an opinion letter
would be supplied to Interstate, the acquired corporation, stating that
NSMC had taken all steps necessary to consummate the merger, and that
to the knowledge of counsel there was no violation of any federal or
state statute or regulation. 114 The merger was approved as required by
the shareholders of both corporations on the basis of proxy material furnished to them by their respective corporations and prepared by counsel.115 At the closing, a proposed closing letter from the accountant
required by the agreement contained certain reservations, indicating that
instead of the nine-month profit of approximately $700,000 reflected in
the NSMC financial statements in the proxy materials, adjustments
would have to be made which would show a net loss of approximately
$80,000 for the period. 116 Despite this information, which allegedly
neither counsel passed on to its client, counsel delivered their required
opinions and the merger was consummated. 117
The SEC alleged that the lawyers should not have permitted the closing to occur, and should have insisted that the financial statements be
revised and the shareholqers resolicited. If their clients still wished to proceed without such disclosure to the shareholders, counsel should have
abandoned their representation and advised the SEC.U 8 It should be
noted that in each instance the opinion of counsel was not delivered to
edge that any material representation made by a client is not true and correct in material
respects; (2) that if the firm becomes aware of any false or misleading misrepresentation or warranty by the client, it will advise the client of the clients' disclosure obligations under the Federal Securities Laws; and (3) if the client does not take appropriate
action to comply with such obligation, to consider the need to withdraw from employ,ment or take other appropriate action. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp. (1977)
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ~96,027.
110
Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See note
103 supra.
Ill Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
This section prohibits solicitation of proxies for any security registered under section 12
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), in contravention of the rules
of the Commission. See note 12 supra.
112
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970 & Supp. V
1975).
113
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
114
SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, 289 (D.D.C. 1973).
11s Id.
116
Id. at 289-90.
117 Id. at 290.
However, the materiality of the adverse financial statements in the
accountant's letter to the stockholders of NSMC is open to some question, since the
financials tended to make the terms of the merger more attractive, if anything, to the
shareholders of NSMC. It is questionable, moreover, whether a reasonable shareholder
of NSMC who had approved the merger would consider the omitted facts important in
deciding how to vote, while the shareholders of Interstate clearly should have been resolicited. See TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), where an omitted
fact from a proxy statement was found to be material if there was a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider the fact important in deciding how to vote.
118
SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, '1m (D.D.C. 19'73).
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its own client but to the other party to the merger. The above charges
arose out of the performance of counsel as lawyers in the exercise of
their professional judgment, 119 and were characterized in a memorandum
by defendant's counsel as a "breach of the most fundamental ethical and
professional obligation of counsel." 12 Certainly, this appears to have
been the first time that such an allegation had been asserted by the
government in an action against counsel, 121 and may be inconsistent
with an attorney's responsibilities as set forth in the Code of Professional
Responsibility .122 Nevertheless, the court denied motions to dismiss
for failure to state a claim and for summary judgment on the grounds
that the acts with which they were charged, if performed with an awareness that the financial statements were false and misleading, could have
been a knowing and willful violation of the securities laws. 123 This
would seem to be a sound decision, and while neither the complaints nor
the court's opinion is clear on this point, they seem to assert a duty on the
part of Interstate's counsel both to the shareholders of their client Interstate and to NSMC, and a comparable duty by NSMC's counsel to shareholders of both corporations, not to permit either party to the merger to
violate the securities laws to the detriment of the shareholders of either
corporation. 124 This is a logical extension of the thesis that the true client
of a corporate lawyer is not the entity but its shareholders, and perhaps
members of the public as well. 125

°

III.

PRIVILEGED CoMMUNICATIONS

Since the legal problems of corporate lawyers are so often disclosure
problems, the principal ethical questions for lawyers that have surfaced
recently and are likely to surface in the near future will also involve disclosure, and hence the issue of the attorney-client privilege. The
American Bar Association opposes the legal development discussed in
this Article, maintaining that a lawyer's responsibility is exclusively to
the corporate entity which is his client, and that this important relationship can be maintained properly only by asserting the doctrine that
communications between a client and his attorney are privileged. 126
119
See Memorandum filed by Arnold & Porter as Counsel for certain defendants in
SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973).
120 Id.
121 A search of the literature has failed to disclose any comparable prior charge.
But
see SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973).
122 See note 5 supra.
123 Cf. SEC v. Century Investment Transfer Corp., [1971-72 TRANSFER BINDER] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) -~ 93,232 (S.D.N.Y. 1971} (an attorney's opinion letters were in"consistent with a statute on its face and were used to facilitate the illegal distribution
of unregistered securities. The court found his conduct "enough beyond a mere mistake
in legal judgment to constitute a probable violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the
securities Acts laws" and approved issue of a preliminary injunction).
124 SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, 296-99 (D.D.C. 1973).
125 See Part II A-D of the text supra.
128 See ABA STATEMENT OF PoLICY REGARDING SEC CoMPLIANCE, supra note 107,
31 Bus. LAw. at 54348.
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The attorney-client privilege was discussed briefly in connection with
Wolfinbarger but deserves further attention. 127
The policy behind the privilege is founded upon the subjective determination made in the eighteenth century that, to promote the freedom of
legal consultations, apprehension of compelled disclosure must be removed.128 Two hundred years later it may be appropriate to reexamine
that subjective determination as applied to the modern public corporation.129
"The beginning point," as the Fifth Circuit, citing Wigmore, stated in
Wolfinbarger, "is the fundamental principle that the public has the right
to every man's evidence, and that exemptions from the general duty to
give testimony that one is capable of giving are distinctly exceptional." 130
Such exceptions are to be determined by "a balancing of interests
between injury resulting from disclosure and the benefit gained in the
correct disposal of litigation." 131
Wigmore sets forth four fundamental conditions recognized as necessary to the establishment of a privilege not to disclose confidential
communications. 132 All of these four conditions must be present for a
privilege to be recognized, 133 and two are pertinent here:
I. The element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties.
2. The injury that would inure to the relationship by the
disclosure of the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation. 134
However, the ethical disclosure problems of corporate lawyers rarely
involve litigation, except for stockholder derivative suits, so that a
broadening reformulation of Wigmore's second condition in a manner
consistent with the thesis presented in this Article will be useful for
analysis. 135 Wigmore's modified second condition would read as
follows:

127
See the discussion of Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970) in the
text accompanying notes 54-66 supra.
128 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (rev. ed., J. McNaughton 1961).
129 See Gamer v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), in which the court made
a similar analysis but on the more limited question of the rights of shareholder plaintiff
in a derivative suit to access to privileged communications.
130 Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, llOO (5th Cir. 1970) (citing 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 128, at§ 2192).
131 Gamer v. WoJfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, ll01 (5th Cir. 1970).
132
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 128, at § 2285. The two conditions not discussed in
the text are that the communication must originate in a confidence that it will not be disclosed and the relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered.
133 Id.
134
Id. (Emphasis in original).
135
Compare the discussion in Part III of this article with ABA Code EC 7-3, 7-4, 7-5.
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2. The injury that would inure to the corporate attorneyclient relationship by the disclosure of the communication must
be greater than the benefit gained thereby for the protection of
significant interests of the shareholders of the corporation or
the public. 136
Determining the "public interest" may not always be easy. For purposes of this discussion the "protection of the public interest" will be
defined as the prevention or uncovering of a crime or fraud which may
have a materially adverse effect on a significant interest of the shareholders of a corporation or the general public.
A.

The Code of Professional Responsibility

The American Bar Association has continued to resist any expansion
of lawyers' professional responsibilities by maintaining that a lawyer's
sole responsibility is to his own client, which in the case of a corporation
is the corporate entity, and by asserting the doctrine of attorney-client
privilege. 137 The corporate entity theory has been discussed above.
In the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, the attorney-client privilege is interposed between what might without the Code be termed a
lawyer's ethical duty to disclose wrongdoing, and his ability 'to fulfill that
duty without violating the Code's provisions. This is accomplished
primarily through two Disciplinary Rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Disciplinary Rule 4-101 states in part:
(B)

(C)

Except when permitted under DR4-101(C}, a lawyer shall
not knowingly:
(1} Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a third person, unless the client
consents after full disclosure.
A lawyer may reveal:
(1} Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or
clients affected, but only after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the
information necessary to prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct. 138

136
See the discussion of the possible duty of the corporate lawyer to the public, and
the conflict between that duty and his duty to his principle client in parts III, D, E of the
text supra.
137 See ABA STATEMENT OF PoLICY REGARDING SEC CoMPLIANCE, supra note 107.
138 ABA Code DR 4-lOl(B), (C).
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Disciplinary Rule 7-102 states in part:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: (1)
His client, has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated
a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his
client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable
to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal except when the information is protected as a privileged
communication. 139
Moreover, while an attorney may not violate the attorney-client privilege in order to disclose corporate wrongdoing affecting the shareholders or the public, he may disregard the privilege in order to establish
or collect his fee. 140 This reflects a strange ordering of values, and
yields an inconsistent result under Wigmore's modified second condition.

B. Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information
The conflict that can arise between the need for public disclosure by
counsel and the inhibitions imposed on that disclosure by attorneyclient privilege as expressed in the Code of Professional Responsibility141 is illustrated by a policy recently formulated by the ABA regarding
lawyers' responses to auditors' requests for information. A preliminary
report, drafted by the ABA in 1974, observed that the American "legal,
political and economic systems depend to an important extent on public confidence in published financial statements." 142 These statements
are accompanied by the opinion of an independent certified public accountant that he has examined the statements and found them to
"fairly present the financial condition of the company and the results
of its operations for the period included in the financial statements in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles."143
To meet professional auditing standards in this examination, the
accountant is required to obtain sufficient competent evidence to afford
a reasonable basis for his opinion, 144 and evidence obtained from
sources outside the company provide greater assurance of reliability. 145
The corporate lawyer is one of those independent sources. 146 If the accountant is unable to complete these procedures satisfactorily, he must
139 Id. at DR 7-102 B(1).
The italicized phrase was added in 1974. See ABA, MIDYEAR
MEETING, SUMMARY AND REPORTS 3 (1974).
140 ABA Code DR 4-101(C)(4).
141 See text accompanying note 138 supra.
142 ABA SECI10N OF CoRPoRATE, BANKING AND BusiNESS LAw, ScoPE OF LAWYERS'
RESPONSES TO AUDITORS' REQUESTS FOR iNFORMATION (rev. exposure draft Aug. 1974),
reprinted in 30 Bus. LAw. 513, 515 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT ON AuDrroRS'
REQUESTS].
143 Id., 30 Bus. LAw. at 520.

Id.
Id.
146 Id.
144

145
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qualify his opinion or issue a disclaimer of opinion. 147 Such an opmwn
will not be acceptable to the SEC in connection with the public offering
of securities. 148 Therefore, the failure of a lawyer to respond properly
to an auditor's request for information could have serious consequences
for the corporation. In recent years, accountants have broadened their
request for information from attorneys to include not only a description
and evaluation of present litigation, impending litigation, and asserted
claims, but also of unasserted contingent claims of which the attorney
has knowledge. 149 This development has concerned the American Bar
Association because complete compliance with such an auditor's request could impinge on the attorney-client privilege. 150 As a result of
discussions between representatives of the two professions, a mutually
acceptable procedure was adopted, 151 purportedly recognizing both
the importance of public confidence in published financial statements
and the Heed to maintain the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship.152
The accountant does not request information directly from the attorney. Rather, the client at the auditor's direction asks his counsel to furnish the company's accountants with certain information. This request
could constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, 153 though
given somewhat under duress because of pressure from the accountant,
provided counsel assures himself that the client understands the consequences of the disclosure in providing an informed consent. 154
Furnishing responses with respect to asserted claims and pending
litigation created no problem in this regard. 155 The principle area of conflict
involved contingent liabilities for unasserted claims. In the ABA's view, the
disclosure of such matters might stimulate claims or lawsuits and cut off the
free flow of information from clients which is necessary for good legal
advice. 156 The conflict was generally resolved in favor of nondisclosure. 157
r

ld.
Id., 30 Bus. LAw. at 521.
149 ld., 30 Bus. LAw. at 524.
1so I d., 30 Bus. LAw. at 521.

147

148

151 AMERICAN
BAR AssoclATION, STATEMENT OF PouCY REGARDING LAWYEHS' RESPONSES TO AUDITOHS' REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION (approved Dec. 8, 1975), reprinted in
31 Bus. LAw. 1709 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ABA PouCY REGARDING AunrmHS' REQUESTS].- Guidelines for auditors and accountants are set forth in AICPA AUDITING
STANDARDS EXECUTIVE CoMMITI'EE, INQUIRY oF A CUENT's LAWYER CoNCERNING LITIGATION, CLAIMS, AND AssESSMENTS (issued Jan. 1976), 1 AICPA PRoF. STANDS. REP.
(CCH) AU § 337; and FINANCIAL AccoUNTING STANDARDS BoARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AccoUNTING STANDARDS No. 5: AccouNTING FOR CoNTINGENCIES, 3 AICPA
PRoF. STANDS. REP. (CCH) AC § 4311.
152
See ABA PouCY REGARDING AunrmHS' REQUESTS, supra note 151, 31 Bus. LAw.
at 1709-10.
153
Id., 31 Bus. LAw. at 1716.
154 ld., 31 Bus. LAw. at 1711, 1716.
155
Id., 31 Bus. LAw. at 1712.
1511 See ABA REPORT ON AunrmHS' REQUESTS, supra note 142, 30 Bus. LAw. at 524.
15
~ See ABA PouCY REGARDING AuniTOHS' REQUESTS, supra note 151.
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One type of unasserted claim is of special interest. This is a potential claim arising from the failure of the corporation to make an obligatory public disclosure, which if discovered would clearly subject the
corporation to material liability, despite the advice of counsel that such
disclosure was obligatory .158 Under guidelines proposed in the 1974
ABA report, 159 an attorney who had given such advice could make an
appropriate disclosure in response to an auditor's request for information, provided that the obligatory public disclosure was not merely the
advisable or preferred course, but was "of such importance and seriousness that rejection by the client of such advice would in all probability require the lawyer's withdrawal from employment in accordance
with the Code of Professional Responsibility." 160 This guideline represented a change in the positions traditionally held by lawyers, 161 but
unfortunately this enlightened view did not prevail in the final Statement of Policy. 162 Instead, the approved Statement of Policy notes that
the lawyer should not knowingly participate in any violation by the
client of the disclosure requirements of the Securities Acts, and that he
may be required to resign in appropriate circumstances if his advice
concerning disclosures is disregarded by the client. 163 This appears to
do no more than apply the present ABA Code of Professional Responsibility164 to securities lawyers.
There is admittedly a genuine corporate interest in refraining from
advertising claims which have not been asserted and which, unless brought to
light by the client, may never be asserted. On the other hand, facts leading to
potential claims by shareholders or the public seem an appropriate matter for
disclosure, and in keeping with the previously discussed 165 duty of the
corporate lawyer to both groups. The client's request on behalf of the auditors
contains a consent to disclosure, albeit a pressured consent. But without such
pressures many corporations would reveal little, either to the auditors or to the
public. Why then must the bar reach so far to protect a knowledgeable and
consenting client from itself? The suspicion remains that the bar may be
protecting lawyers as well as their clients. 166

C.

Disclosure or Privilege

To examine the validity of the ABA position that disclosures of privi158

See ABA REPORT oN AuDITORS' REQUESTS, supra note 142, 30 Bus. LAw. at 517.
Id.
160 Id. (emphasis in original).
161 Id., 30 Bus. LAw. at 513.
Part IV of the Report summarizes comments express1s9

ing concern over the proposed policy, submitted by members of the ABA Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law. Id., 30 Bus. LAw. at 529-30.
162 See ABA PoLICY REGARDING AuDITORS' REQUESTS, supra note 151.
163 Compare id., 31 Bus. LAw. at 1714, with ABA REPORT oN AuDITORS' REQUESTS,
supra note 142, 30 Bus. LAw. at 517.
164 See ABA Code DR 7-102 (A)(3), (7) and (8); DR 2-110(B)(2).
165
See Part III C, D and E of the text.
166
See ABA REPORT ON AunrroRS' REQUESTS, supra note 143, 30 Bus. LAw. at 524.
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leged information by an attorney, even as to matters of significant
shareholder or public interest, is never justified except as permitted
by the Code of Professional Responsibility, it will be useful to test it
against Wigmore's two conditions. 167
The first condition requires that confidentiality must be essential
to the relationship between the parties. Confidentiality between a
corporation and its counsel is useful, but no more essential than among
directors, officers, and key employees who are involved in the corporate
decision-making process and whose communications are not privileged.168 Information must be furnished to selected individuals in the
corporate structure or else decisions could not be made. It appears
unlikely that management will refuse to communicate confidential information to a more trusted, if unprivileged, advisor when his advice is
considered important, and when such conferral may be an essential
part of a due diligence defense to a civil or criminal action. 169 An affirmative duty of disclosure by counsel should not seriously inhibit client
communication, since counsel may at present reveal confidences to
prevent present or future crimes, 170 and willful violations of the securities acts are crimes. 171 Nor should a corporate officer conferring with
his advisors assume that only a lawyer would feel obliged to disclose
significant corporate improprieties. In the absence of empirical data,
it is possible only to speculate on the importance of confidentiality to
the attorney-corporate client relationship, but perhaps the burden of
proof should be on those who would assert the privilege. 172
Wigmore's modified second condition 173 balances the benefits of
disclosure to the shareholders and the public against the damaging
effects of such disclosure upon the attorney-client relationship and the
property rights of a large amorphous entity. Perhaps of even greater
benefit to the public interest would be the restoration of confidence
in the integrity of the bar as guardians of freedom, rather than as corporate servants whose morality is measured by the actions of their
clients. Moreover, it has been postulated herein 174 that one of the interests of shareholders is, as a matter of public policy, to have their
corporation behave in a lawful manner. Nor is there any public or
shareholder interest in allowing a corporation and its management to

167

168

See text accompanying note 134 supra.
See the discussion of privilege in 8

J.

WIGMORE,

supra note 128, at §§ 2191,

2286.
169 Failure to use due diligence has included aiding and abetting a violation for false
statements on securities registration. See In Re Equity Funding Corp. of America Securities Litigation, 416 F. Supp. 161 (C.D. Cal. 1976); In Re Caesars Palace Securities Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also note 74 supra.
170
ABA Code DR 4-10l(C)(3), quoted in the text at note 138 supm.
171 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(x) 78f(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
172
A carefully drawn empirical study of the need for the privilege in corporate
lawyer-client relations might prove most useful.
173
See text accompanying notes 135-36 supra.
174
See text following note 64 supra.

1977]

ETHICS AND THE CORPORATE LAWYER

359

consult an attorney, and then to ignore with impunity his advice that
a present policy or proposed action of the corporation is improperP5
This restoration of confidence in the bar requires among other
things a change in the Code of Professional Responsibility with respect
to matters of corporate disclosure. To take an extreme example, what
must a lawyer do when his client tells him in confidence that he is going to plant a time bomb aboard TWA's flight 703 leaving New York
for Paris next Sunday afternoon at 6:00 p.m.? Nothing, according to
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which permits but does not require a lawyer to reveal his client's confidence in order to prevent a
crime. 176 Presumably, all lawyers would contact the appropriate authorities. It is less clear that a corporate lawyer will voluntarily inform the
authorities upon learning in confidence that his client plans to file a
criminally false report with the Civil Aeronautics Board, which the
lawyer will not prepare or file, that a commercial passenger plane it is
manufacturing meets the required safety standards. Still less likely is
the possibility that a corporate lawyer would advise the Commission
that in a corporate annual report on SEC Form 10K, 177 which he
neither prepared nor will file, his client will falsely state against his advice that the plane meets all federal safety standards. These are differences of degree and not principle. Disclosure should be mandatory
in each instance. The attorney clearly may not knowingly assist in the
preparing or filing of a false report, 178 and given the previously postulated duty to the shareholders and to the public, he should not silently
tolerate such conduct even where he has not personally prepared the
report.
Assume further that the attorney learned of the false statements after the documents have been filed and processed, but before there has
been an accident or any securities have been sold. As before, assume
that the lawyer was not responsible for the preparation of the documents. The client no longer intends to commit a crime; the crime has
already been committed, though it will have a future effect. Under the
Disciplinary Rules, the attorney would not be permitted to make disclosure of the privileged information, 179 yet the public interest would
seem to require disclosure. Even in the more difficult situation in which
the attorney learns of the false statements after the first plane has
crashed or securities have been sold in reliance upon the false financial
statements, should not the lawyer speak before the second plane
crashes or additional securities are sold? The Disciplinary Rules say
"no."180 If the defective planes have been grounded or the securities
offering has been completed, then there is no future harm to be pre-

175

See Gamer v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1973).
ABA Code DR 4-lOl(C).
177 17 C.F.R. ~ 249.310 (1976).
178 ABA Code EC 7-5. It would also constitute aiding and abetting.
!79 ABA Code DR 4-101.
18o Id.
11a
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vented, and disclosure would primarily affect prospective litigation and
should not be made. However, if the attorney unknowingly assisted in
the preparation of the false documents, then, since the fraud was committed "in the course of the [attorney's] representation" and "upon a
person or tribunal," the attorney must with one significant exception
reveal the fraud if his client refuses to do so. 181 The exception is that
counsel may not reveal the fraud when the information is protected as
a privileged communication, 182 even as planes crash and investors are
defrauded.
This discussion of the shortcomings of the present Code of Professional Responsibility is not to say that the attorney-client relationship
is not important in the corporate setting, but rather that the attorneyclient privilege should not have continued viability in those areas in
which there are prevailing and conflicting shareholder or public interests.183
IV.

A

PROPOSAL FOR REFORM

The present ethical mode of the corporate bar, as this Article has
demonstrated, is under increasing challenge by the SEC and the courts.
The lawyer-corporate client relationship, important as it may be, cannot
continue to defeat public expectations of responsible professional conduct. As the Fifth Circuit remarked about the ABA brief in W olfinbarger, it "does not always distinguish clearly between the separate
interests of the corporate client and the attorney in freedom from disclosure, nor is it always possible to do so." 184 However, any concern
of the bar that stricter standards might result in increased exposure of
its members to civil liabilities for negligence under Rule lOb-5 was
removed by the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 185
Perhaps a lessening of the bar's resistance to reform may follow.
If the bar is brought to reform by the courts and the SEC, there will
be a long period of uncertainty due to the conflict between the ·code of
Professional Responsibility, with its reliance on the corporate entity
theory and the privileged attorney-corporate client relationship, and
the developments in the courts and the SEC. Nor will the bar's image

181 ABA Code DR 7-102(B)(1).
See note 138 supra. It is not clear whether "tribunal"
would include an administrative agency acting in its administrative rather than judicial
capacity.
1s2 Id.
183 Compare ABA STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING SEC CoMPLIANCE, supra note
107, with Gamer v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103 (5th Cir. 1970).
184 430 F.2d at 1102.
The ABA's position was that the privilege is most necessary
where a lawyer furnishes a corporation his opinion that a prospective transaction is not
lawful but the corporation disregards his advice. Counsel, urged the ABA, must be free
to state his opinion without fear of later disclosure and without the privilege counsel
might in the words of the brief, be "required by the threat of future discovery to hedge
or soften their opinions." This is still very much the ABA's position. See ABA STATEMENT
of PoLICY REGARDING SEC CoMPLIANCE, supra note 107.
" 5 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
See note 101 supra.
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be enhanced by a prolonged resistance to reform evidenced by reluctance to amend the Code.
Several proposed changes in the Code of Professional Responsibility, designed to meet some of the needs for higher standards forseen
by this Article with a minimum of disruption of traditional values, are
set forth below, followed by brief commentary.
Proposed Disciplinary Rule 4-lOl(E), (F), (G), and (H)

DR 4-101 186 (E) A lawyer for a public corporation shall reveal the intention of the corporation or any of its officers or directors (individually or on behalf of the corporation) by an act
or omission to act:
(1) to commit a crime and the information necessary to
prevent the crime.
(2) to commit a fraud, tort, or act of questionable legality
materially and adversely affecting the shareholders of the corporation.
(F) A lawyer for a public corporation shall reveal a crime
which has already been committed by the corporation or any
of its officers or directors (individually or on behalf of the corporation) if the failure to disclose the crime may have a material adverse effect in the future on a significant interest of the
public or of the shareholders of the corporation.
(G) The provisions of DR 4-101 (E) (2) and (F) shall not
apply to confidential communications made with respect to
overtly threatened or pending litigation. 187
(H) 188 A lawyer shall not make the revelations required
by DR 4-101 (E) and (F) until he has advised the appropriate
officers and the board of directors of his advice concerning the
proposed or continuing course of action or refusal to act, which
advice in his opinion reflects the required and not merely the
advisable or preferred course, and that the matter is of such
importance and seriousness that rejection by the client of the
advice would in all probability require the lawyer's withdrawal
from employment and his advising of the appropriate authorities in accordance with the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and the officers or board of directors have failed to take appropriate corrective action after a reasonable opportunity to do so.
First and foremost, these sections make the lawyer's obligation to
disclose a client's intended crime mandatory rather than permissive. 189 ·
186
These are new sections to replace ABA Code DR 4-10l(C)(3) with respect to
public corporate clients.
187
Under the original theory of the attorney-client privilege only communications
received after the beginning of litigation were considered confidential. 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 128, § 2290 at 544.
188
This is a new section.
9
18 See Part IV C of the text.
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Subsection (E)(l) extends the lawyer's obligation to disclose intended
crimes of officers and directors of the corporation, to avoid such questions as whether the officer or director was acting within the scope of
his authority. The provision is not intended to change the lawyer's
obligation as to completely unrelated crimes, such as the vice president's intention to beat up his wife when he gets home. Subsection (E)
(2) carries out the thesis expressed in Part III of this Article by requiring counsel to disclose to shareholders frauds, torts, or acts of questionable legality-acts which might give rise to stockholder derivative suits
or shareholder doubts about the integrity of management, such as participation in corporate bribery. Disclosure is also required of past crimes
when the failure to disclose could work a significant future harm to
the shareholders or to the public. 19° For example, if a corporate lawyer
learns in confidence that his client has filed a materially false annual
report on form lOK with the SEC, which the lawyer did not prepare,
but upon which shareholders and members of the investing public will
continue to rely for some time to come, he would be under an obligation
to disclose the false filing. However, subparagraph (H) has been added
to make it clear that the matter must be of considerable importance,
and that in the lawyer's opinion the recommended remedial action must
clearly be required. His opinion must be brought home directly to the
appropriate officers and the board before he makes any disclosure. Except in rare instances, a corporation is not likely to disregard such advice and thereby force a disclosure, so the threat must be used with
caution by attorneys and with confidence that they are right. Economic
self-interest in a continuing retainer with the client should adequately
restrain counsel, except in circumstances in which the facts of the
situation and the reluctance of the client to follow professional advice
make conflict inevitable. These changes would not apply to privileged
communications in pending or overtly threatened litigation.

Proposed Ethical Consideration 5-18
5-18191

EC
A lawyer employed or retained by a public
corporation owes his allegiance to all of the shareholders as a
group, qua shareholders, and not to the corporate entity nor
to any director, officer, employee, representative, or other person
connected with the corporation; but in his representation the
lawyer shall take his instructions solely from the board of directors as the elected representatives of the shareholders, and
from the officers of the corporation chosen by such board. In
the normal course of business the interests of the shareholders
qua shareholders will be co-extensive, provided however that
when there may be differing interests among the shareholders
a lawyer may follow the instructions of the board of directors
so long as it does not require him to assist the corporation in
190
191

Id.
This replaces the first two sentences of ABA Code EC 5-18. See note 5 supra.
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performing an act described in subsections (1) or (2) of DR
4-101(E).
This Ethical Consideration is an outgrowth of the point of view expressed in Part III of this Article, and provides a rationale for the disclosure obligations imposed on lawyers by proposed sections DR 4-101
(E) and (F). A shareholder-director who proposes to enter into an agreement with the corporation does so as an individual and not qua shareholder. Occasions may arise where the economic interest of the controlling shareholders of the corporation is different than other stockholders, and this dilemma is resolved by allowing the attorney to follow
the instructions of the board, subject to his disclosure obligations under
these proposed rules.
Proposed Disciplinary Rule 7-lOl(C)
DR 7-101(C) 192 In his representation of a public corporation a
lawyer shall refuse to aid or participate in conduct that he believes to
be unlawful even though. there is some support for an argument that
the conduct is legal.
The word "may" in present DR 7-101(B}(2) has been changed to
"shall" so that a lawyer cannot be put in the anamolous position of
being required under proposed DR 4-101(E) to disclose corporate conduct ih which he assisted despite his personal belief that such conduct
was unlawful.
Proposed Disciplinary Rule 7-102(C)
DR 7-102(C) 193 A lawyer for a public corporation who receives information clearly establishing that the corporation in
the course of the representation commited a fraud upon a person, tribunal, or administrative agency shall promptly call
upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or
is unable to do so, he shall promptly reveal the fraud to the
affected person, tribunal, or agency.
(1} 194 If disclosure to the affected persons is not practical,
then disclosure to an appropriate governmental authority may
be made instead.
The purpose of the change is to make the section applicable to administrative agencies, not sitting as a tribunal, and to provide a viable

192
This is a new section to replace ABA Code EC 7-101(B)(2) with respect to public
corporate clients.
193
This is a new section to replace ABA Code DR 7-102(B)(1) with respect to public
corporate clients, and would remove the privilege exception added to that subsection
in 1974 as to such clients. For the present version of this rule, see the text accompanying note 139 supra. See also ABA Code, EC 7-26, 7-27.
19< This is a new section.
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mechanism for disclosure when a fraud is perpetrated on all of the
shareholders of a corporation or the public at large.
V.

CoNcLusioN

The revlSlons of the Code of Professional Responsibility suggested
in this Article reflect trends in the regulation of corporate lawyers by the
SEC and the courts. These changes will not in practice tum a corporation's counsel into a tattler, but will give him an effective veto over
certain improper corporate acts. What the bar will not do for itself
others will eventually do for it. Strong and mature counsel, by the nature of their relationships with their clients, have long had a practical
veto over their clients' acts if they have chosen to exercise it, and observation would indicate that they usually have. However, the weaker or
less scrupulous lawyers must be given firm guidelines. The standards
of all must be raised to what hopefully are already the standards of the
many, and the lawyer-client privilege should not stand as an obstacle
to lawyers in their quest for a higher ethic.

